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ABSTRACT
This paper uses our new database on bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries to assess
the relationship between specific regulatory and supervisory practices and banking-sector development,
efficiency, and fragility. The paper examines: (i) regulatory restrictions on bank activities and the mixing
of banking and commerce; (ii) regulations on domestic and foreign bank entry; (iii) regulations on capital
adequacy; (iv) deposit insurance system design features; (v) supervisory power, independence, and
resources, (vi) loan classification stringency, provisioning standards, and diversification guidelines; (vii)
regulations fostering information disclosure and privatesector monitoring of banks; and (viii) government
ownership. The results, albeit tentative, raise a cautionary flag regarding government policies that rely
excessively on direct government supervision and regulation of bank activities. The findings instead
suggest that policies that rely on guidelines that (1) force accurate information disclosure, (2) empower
private-sector corporate control of banks, and (3) foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate
control work best to promote bank development, performance and stability.
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The staggering scope of recent banking crises coupled with strong evidence on the beneficial 
effects of well-functioning banking systems for economic growth underscore current efforts to reform 
bank regulation and supervision.
1 In January 2001, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
issued a proposal for a Basel II Capital Accord that, once finalized, will replace the 1988 Basel I 
Capital Accord. The proposal is based on three pillars. The first deals with improved minimum bank 
capital requirements, the second focuses on better supervisory practices, and the third envisions greater 
market discipline through increased information disclosed by banks. Once the Basel Committee 
finalizes its list of “best practices” for the regulation and supervision of banks, countries around the 
world will be urged to adopt them. The belief is that the banking sectors in countries adopting these 
practices will function better, thereby promoting growth and stability.  
Unfortunately, however, there is no evidence: that any universal set of best practices is 
appropriate for promoting well-functioning banks; that successful practices in the United States, for 
example, will succeed in countries with different institutional settings; or that detailed regulations and 
supervisory practices should be combined to produce an extensive checklist of best practices in which 
more checks are better than fewer. There is no broad cross-country evidence on which of the many 
different regulations and supervisory practices employed around the world work best, if at all, to 
promote bank development and stability. 
This paper attempts to help close this gap by examining the relationship between bank 
regulation and supervision and bank development, performance and stability using our newly 
assembled database. We conducted a survey of national regulatory agencies and obtained information 
on numerous bank regulations and supervisory practices in 107 countries. The data, primarily from 
1999, are used to assess which regulations and supervisory practices are associated with greater bank 
development, better performance, and increased stability as well as those that are not. We specifically 
examine regulations on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce; regulations on 
domestic and foreign bank entry; regulations on capital adequacy; deposit insurance; supervisory 
power, independence, and resources; loan classification stringency, provisioning standards, 
                                                 
1 On crises, see Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) and Boyd, Kwak and Smith (2000). On growth, see Levine (1997). 
  1diversification guidelines; regulations fostering information disclosure and private-sector monitoring 
of banks; and government ownership of banks. Thus, this paper provides empirical evidence on each of 
the three pillars associated with the Basel II Capital Accord. 
Economic theory provides conflicting predictions about the effects of each of these bank 
regulations and supervisory practices on bank development, performance, and stability. Some argue, 
for example, in favor of restricting banks from participating in securities, insurance, and real estate 
activities or from owning nonfinancial firms. They stress that (i) neither private nor official entities can 
effectively monitor such complex banks due to informational asymmetries and (ii) both the market and 
political power enjoyed by such banks can impede competition and adversely influence policies. 
Others argue the opposite, stressing that (i) informational asymmetries are not that great, (ii) potential 
adverse spillovers to the entire economy are not sufficient to warrant such restrictions, and (iii) fewer 
restrictions allow banks to exploit economies of scale and scope and thereby provide services more 
efficiently. An examination of countries with different regulations for bank activities can help resolve 
this debate. More generally, we discuss the theoretical predictions surrounding each of the regulations 
and supervisory practices noted above in subsequent sections and then empirically examine its 
relationship to bank development, performance and stability. 
Theory also provides more subtle predictions about the precise conditions under which 
regulations and supervisory practices enhance bank development, performance and stability. Some 
models, for instance, predict that the correct answer to the question as to whether countries should 
restrict bank activities is “it depends on other policies and institutions.” Boyd, Chang, and Smith 
(1998) argue that in a country with generous deposit insurance that intensifies moral hazard problems, 
broad banking powers provide excessive opportunities for risk-taking. Thus, they conclude that 
restrictions on bank activities enhance social welfare in countries with generous deposit insurance. 
Similarly, while capital requirements are the mainstay of current approaches to bank regulation and 
supervision, theory predicts that such requirements are particularly beneficial when (i) generous 
deposit insurance distorts incentives, (ii) official supervision is weak, and (iii) complex banks are 
difficult to monitor. For these reasons, analyses of individual regulations and supervisory practices 
should incorporate interaction terms to assess the efficacy of each one in the presence of others. We 
describe and empirically examine many of these more subtle predictions.  
We examine an extensive array of regulations and supervisory practices for a broad cross-
  2section of countries at all levels of development and in all parts of the world. The issues are so 
extensive that one may question our expansive approach, preferring more narrowly focused 
examinations of individual issues. While recognizing the advantages of tightly focused studies, we 
follow the growing literature stressing that the salient issues in bank regulation and supervision are 
inextricably interrelated. Thus, there are advantages to examining an array of supervisory and 
regulatory policies simultaneously to identify those that enjoy a strong, independent relationship with 
financial development and stability. It is perilous, for example, to examine the efficacy of supervisory 
practices without accounting for private sector monitoring.  It is risky to examine restrictions on bank 
securities activities without considering the power of supervisory authorities.  As a final example, there 
are important shortcomings with examining regulations and supervisory practices without accounting 
for the degree of government ownership of banks. Furthermore, given that this paper introduces a new 
database on bank regulation and supervision, it is natural to provide a first assessment of which 
regulations and supervisory practices are associated with successful outcomes across countries.  Thus, 
we simultaneously examine the relationships between numerous regulations and supervisory practices 
and selected banking-sector outcomes using a broad cross-section of countries.  
There are two particularly important methodological limitations to our study. One limitation is 
that we conduct pure cross-country regressions because information on regulations and supervisory 
practices is available only for one point in time. A problem with this approach is that it is difficult to 
control fully for potential simultaneity bias: banking-sector outcomes may influence regulations and 
supervisory practices. We do use instrumental variables to help control for simultaneity bias and these 
procedures do pass basic specification tests. Nonetheless, data limitations do not allow us to use time-
series or panel procedures to examine the same relationships using complementary methods. We were 
able to collect historical data for a few variables, however, and found very little change over time. 
Moreover, controlling for any changes does not alter our findings. The other limitation is that only 
aggregate measures of bank performance are used. Nevertheless, we are in the process of 
complementing and refining our analyses by employing firm-level, industry-level, and bank-level 
datasets and we make our regulation and supervisory available so that others can extend this paper’s 
work. Such complementary studies will provide additional insights into the influence of bank 
regulatory and supervisory practices on various banking-sector outcomes. Until then, our cross-country 
study provides a first, tentative assessment of the relationships between bank development, 
performance and stability and the regulation and supervision of banks around the world. 
  3Before continuing, we note that this paper is naturally related to a long, vast literature on the 
overall role of the government in regulating economic activity (Pigou, 1938; Stigler, 1971). Each of the 
specific regulatory/supervisory issues noted above could be framed in terms of arguments for greater 
government intervention -- and the form that those interventions should take -- and arguments against 
direct government interventions. Many arguments in favor of government intervention are Pigouvian: 
the existence of monopoly power, externalities, and informational asymmetries create a potentially 
constructive role for government interventions to offset these market failures and enhance social 
welfare. The Pigouvian view takes as given both that there are market failures and that the government 
can and will act to ameliorate those failures. Others disagree. Some argue that market failures are not 
very large.  Others argue that governments act in their own interests and frequently do not ameliorate 
market failures (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). According to this view, regulations that empower the 
private-sector to monitor banks will be more effective than direct government interventions at 
enhancing bank performance and stability. Our analyses provide evidence regarding the efficacy of 
direct government interventions in the banking sector.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the theoretical and policy debates 
surrounding each of the issues noted earlier. Section III discusses our dataset and some basic 
correlations. Section IV presents regression results, while Section V contains conclusions 
II. Theoretical and Policy Debates 
This section discusses seven policy issues. For each issue, we: (1) stress the conflicting 
theoretical predictions and policy debates, (2) emphasize that specific regulations and supervisory 
practices are so inextricably interrelated it is important to examine them simultaneously.  
II.A. Regulations on bank activities and banking-commerce links 
There are five main theoretical reasons for restricting bank activities and banking-commerce 
links. First, conflicts of interest may arise when banks engage in such diverse activities as securities 
underwriting, insurance underwriting, and real estate investment. Such banks, for example, may 
attempt to “dump” securities on ill-informed investors to assist firms with outstanding loans [John, 
John, and Saunders (1994) and Saunders (1985)]. Second, to the extent that moral hazard encourages 
riskier behavior, banks will have more opportunities to increase risk if allowed to engage in a broader 
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Fourth, such banks may become so politically and economically powerful that they become “too big to 
discipline.”  Finally, large financial conglomerates may reduce competition and efficiency. According 
to these arguments, governments can improve banking by restricting bank activities. 
There are alternative theoretical reasons for allowing banks to engage in a broad range of 
activities, however. First, fewer regulatory restrictions permit the exploitation of economies of scale 
and scope [Claessens and Klingebiel (2000)]. Second, fewer regulatory restrictions may increase the 
franchise value of banks and thereby augment incentives for more prudent behavior. Lastly, broader 
activities may enable banks to diversify income streams and thereby create more stable banks.  
In an earlier study, we found that greater restrictions are associated: (1) a higher probability of 
suffering a major banking crisis, and (2) lower banking-sector efficiency [Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 
2001a]. We found no countervailing positive effects. Restricting bank activities were not closely 
associated with less concentration, more competition, or greater securities-market development.  
This paper expands and improves on our earlier research. First, we now have regulation and 
supervision data for substantially (50%) more countries. Second, we assess whether the positive 
association that was found between restrictions and banking crises simply reflected the effects of 
significant omitted variables. Countries with more effective supervision, for example, may impose 
fewer restrictions. If so, the positive relationship between regulatory restrictions and crises we initially 
found might simply reflect the fact that countries with weaker supervision compensate by imposing 
more restrictions on bank activities. Also, we assess whether our initial finding of a positive 
association between restrictions and crises reflects another omitted variable: the deposit insurance 
scheme. Countries with deposit insurance schemes that do not severely distort incentives toward 
greater risk-taking may impose fewer restrictions on bank activities. If so, the positive relationship 
between restrictions and crises may simply reflect the fact that countries imposing more restrictions do 
so to compensate for generous deposit-insurance schemes.  
  5II.B. Regulations on domestic and foreign bank entry  
 Economic theory provides conflicting views on the need for and the effect of regulations on 
entry into banking. Some argue that effective screening of bank entry can promote stability. Others 
stress that banks with monopolistic power possess greater franchise value, which enhances prudent 
risk-taking behavior [Keeley (1990)].  Others, of course, disagree, stressing the beneficial effects of 
competition and the harmful effects of restricting entry [Shleifer and Vishny, 1998]. 
This paper assesses whether greater restrictions on the entry of foreign and domestic banks are 
associated with less bank development, worse performance and more fragility. This helps fill a lacuna 
because existing cross-country studies do not use direct measures of entry policies.
2  Also, we assess 
whether the relationship between bank development and competition policies depends on regulatory 
restrictions on bank activities, the power and independence of bank supervisory authorities, the deposit 
insurance scheme, capital adequacy requirements, the degree of equity market development, and the 
extent of government ownership of banks. Our dataset enables us to explore whether the relationships 
between competition and bank development, performance, and stability depend on these other factors.  
II.C. Regulations on capital adequacy  
Traditional approaches to bank regulation emphasize the positive features of capital adequacy 
requirements [Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)]. Capital serves as a buffer against losses and hence 
failure. Furthermore, with limited liability, the proclivity for banks to engage in higher risk activities is 
curtailed with greater amounts of capital at risk. Capital adequacy requirements, especially with 
deposit insurance, play a crucial role in aligning the incentives of bank owners with depositors and 
other creditors [Berger, Herring and Szego (1995) and Keeley and Furlong (1990)]. 
As reviewed in Santos (2001), however, theory provides conflicting predictions as to whether 
the imposition of capital requirements reduces risk-taking incentives. For instance, Koehn and 
Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988), and Blum (1999) argue that capital requirements may 
increase risk-taking behavior. Given (i) conflicting theoretical predictions, (ii) Alan Greenspan’s 
(1998) view that existing capital requirements are arbitrary and inadequate, and (iii) the controversy 
over the attempt to set new risk-based capital requirements in the Basel II Capital Accord, it seems 
                                                 
2 It is crucial to focus on entry policies since one may simultaneously observe increasing concentration and 
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sector outcomes across countries.  
This paper examines the relationship between capital regulations and bank development and 
stability. Moreover, we do not consider the relationships between capital regulations and banking-
sector outcomes in isolation. We consider counterfactuals in which these relationships may depend on 
other regulations and supervisory practices. The degree to which capital requirements are associated 
with bank development, performance and fragility, for example, may depend upon the specific features 
of any deposit insurance scheme [e.g., Mullins and Pyle, 1994]. The marginal relationship between 
capital regulations and bank behavior may also depend importantly on the powers granted supervisors.   
II.D. Deposit insurance design 
Countries adopt deposit insurance schemes to prevent widespread bank runs.
3  If depositors 
attempt to withdraw their funds all at once, illiquid but solvent banks may be forced into insolvency. 
To protect payment and credit systems from contagious bank runs, many favor deposit insurance plus 
powerful official oversight of banks to augment private-sector monitoring of banks.  
Deposit insurance schemes come at a cost, however. They may encourage excessive risk-taking 
behavior, which some believe offsets any stabilization benefits. Yet, many contend that regulation and 
supervision can control the moral-hazard problem by designing an insurance scheme that encompasses 
appropriate coverage limits, scope of coverage, coinsurance, funding, premia structure, management 
and membership requirements.
4  
We examine the relationship between deposit insurance and bank development and efficiency 
and also assess whether this relationship depends on the extent of capital regulations, official 
supervisory powers, regulatory restrictions on bank activities, and on the extent to which private-sector 
monitoring of banks is promoted.  Recently, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) made a 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
increasing competition [e.g., Boot and Thakor, 1997, 2000; Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999]. 
3 After the adoption of a national deposit insurance system in the United States in 1934, other countries adopted 
explicit systems slowly for the first 30 years, with only 6 being established. Then adoptions accelerated: 22 formal systems 
existed by the 50
th anniversary of the U.S. system, about 70 systems were in place by the close of 2000, and many other 
countries are planning on adopting explicit deposit insurance schemes. 
4 As Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) show for risk-based capital requirements, it is possible theoretically that risk-
based deposit insurance will induce greater risk-taking. Once the (capital requirement or) risk-based deposit insurance 
premia is fixed, bankers may respond by taking greater risk in an attempt to earn their 'required' return.  
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insurance on bank fragility.
5   Due to data limitations, however, their analysis could not control for other 
aspects of regulation and supervision. With our new database, we control for a wide variety of 
regulations and supervisory practices in assessing the relationship between deposit insurance and bank 
development, performance and fragility. 
II.E. Supervision 
Some theoretical models stress the advantages of granting broad powers to supervisors. The 
reasons are as follows. First, banks are costly and difficult to monitor. This leads to too little 
monitoring of banks, which implies sub-optimal performance and stability. Official supervision can 
ameliorate this market failure. Second, because of informational asymmetries, banks are prone to 
contagious and socially costly bank runs. Supervision in such a situation serves a socially efficient 
role. Third, many countries choose to adopt deposit insurance schemes. This situation: (1) creates 
incentives for excessive risk-taking by banks, and (2) reduces the incentives for depositors to monitor 
banks. Strong, official supervision under such circumstances can help prevent banks from engaging in 
excessive risk-taking behavior and thus improve bank development, performance and stability.  
Alternatively, powerful supervisors may exert a negative influence by using their powers to 
benefit favored constituents, attract campaign donations, and extract bribes [Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; 
Djankov, et. al., 2002; and Quintyn and Taylor, 2002]. If so, there will be less interest in overcoming 
market failures and more interest in seeking personal gain. Powerful supervision under these 
circumstances will be positively related to corruption and will not improve bank development, 
performance and stability. 
Countries in practice may assign very different priorities to bank supervision. We can use our 
database to assess the relationships of official supervisory resources, powers, and independence to 
banking-sector outcomes with: (a) the extent of private-sector monitoring, (b) restrictions on bank 
activities, and (c) the degree of moral hazard created by deposit insurance schemes. We can also assess 
the relationships between loan classification and provisioning policies and bank development, 
performance, and stability. Furthermore, we can examine restrictions on international lending that may 
                                                 
5 Briefly, they find that high coverage limits and scope, having a funded scheme, and exclusively public-sector 
participation and management all positively contribute to the likelihood of a crisis.  
  8hinder diversification. 
Although these supervisory practices form the core of many recommendations to improve 
supervision, this paper provides the first cross-country evidence on which supervisory practices are 
positively associated with greater bank development, performance and stability. 
II.F. Regulations on private-sector monitoring of banks 
Supervisory agencies may encourage private monitoring. Our data indicate that some 
supervisory agencies require banks to obtain certified audits and/or ratings from international-rating 
agencies. Some supervisory agencies require banks to produce accurate, comprehensive and 
consolidated information on the full range of their activities and risk-management procedures. Some 
countries even make bank directors legally liable if information is erroneous or misleading. Also, some 
countries credibly impose a “no deposit insurance” policy to stimulate private monitoring. 
There are disagreements about the role of the private sector in monitoring banks. Some 
advocate more reliance on private-sector monitoring, expressing misgivings with official supervision 
of banks. Recently, for instance, the Shleifer and Vishny (1998) view of government regulations 
specifically holds that banks will pressure politicians who, in turn, can unduly influence supervisory 
oversight. Furthermore, in some countries, supervisors are not well compensated and hence quickly 
move into banking, resulting in a situation in which they may face mixed incentives when it comes to 
strictly adhering to the rules. Since supervisors do not have their own wealth invested in banks, they 
also have different incentives than private creditors insofar as monitoring and disciplining banks. There 
are countervailing arguments, however. Countries with poorly-developed capital markets, accounting 
standards, and legal systems may not be able to rely effectively on private monitoring. Furthermore, 
the complexity and opacity of banks may make private sector monitoring difficult even in the most 
developed economies.  From this perspective, therefore, excessively heavy reliance on private 
monitoring may lead to the exploitation of depositors and poor bank performance.  
This paper examines the relationships between regulations and supervisory practices designed 
to promote private-sector monitoring and bank development, performance, and stability, while 
controlling for other regulations and supervisory practices. It also assesses the private-monitoring 
relationships in countries with particular types of policies and institutions as will be discussed below.  
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Economists hold different views about the impact of government ownership of banks. One 
view holds that governments help overcome capital-market failures, exploit externalities, and invest in 
strategically important projects (e.g., Gerschenkron, 1962). According to this view, governments have 
adequate information and incentives to promote socially desirable investments. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998), in contrast, argue that governments do not have sufficient 
incentives to ensure socially desirable investments. Government ownership instead politicizes resource 
allocation, softens budget constraints, and hinders economic efficiency. Thus, government ownership 
facilitates the financing of politically attractive projects, not economically efficient ones.  
In an influential study, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) piece together data on 
government ownership of banks from an assortment of sources. They find that countries with higher 
initial levels of government ownership tend to have subsequently less financial development and 
slower economic growth. In a related paper, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a) use government 
ownership data from Bankscope and find that greater government ownership is generally associated 
with less efficient and less well-developed financial systems. The data used in both papers, however, 
do not cover all banks operating in a country and the degree of coverage varies across countries. 
We make two improvements to existing studies of government-owned banks. First, we use data 
collected from national regulatory agencies. The data cover all banks and the definition of 
“government owned” is consistent across countries. Second, we control for differences in regulations 
and supervisory practices. Thus, we assess whether government ownership is associated with better 
banking-sector outcomes than private ownership with weak regulation and supervision. 
III. Data  
III.A. Dataset 
We designed and implemented a survey funded by the World Bank to collect information on 
bank regulations and supervisory practices for 107 countries. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001b) 
describe the survey questions and data collection process in detail. The completion of the survey 
entailed numerous steps: collecting initial survey responses, reconciling conflicting responses from 
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Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which included some overlap in the information requested, 
further reconciling any inconsistencies, and checking our data with information collected by the 
Institute of International Bankers, and the Financial Stability Forum’s Working Group on Deposit 
Insurance, which provided input on the accuracy of responses for deposit insurance schemes. Thus, in 
numerous cases, we repeatedly communicated with authorities to obtain accurate information.  
The regulatory and supervisory data are primarily from 1999.
6 We frequently group the 
responses to individual questions into aggregate indexes that we define below. This paper uses those 
countries with more than one million people, but confirms the results when restricting the sample to 
countries with more than 200,000 people. We make the data available at the following website: 
www.worldbank.org/research/interest/intrstweb.htm. 
III.B. Variable Definitions 
Since Table 1 provides information on the data, sources, and specific survey questions used to 
construct the variables for this paper, we only briefly define them here in the text.  
1. Bank Activity Regulatory Variables. We measure the degree to which national regulatory 
authorities allow banks to engage in the following three fee-based rather than more traditional 
interest-spread-based activities: 
a.  Securities Activities: the ability of banks to engage in the business of securities 
underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry. 
b.  Insurance Activities: the ability of banks to engage in insurance underwriting and selling. 
c.  Real Estate Activities: the ability of banks to engage in real estate investment, 
development, and management.  
2. Mixing Banking / Commerce Regulatory Variables. We construct two measures of the degree of 
regulatory restrictiveness on the mixing of banking and commerce.  
a.  Banks Owning Nonfinancial Firms measures restrictions on the ability of banks to own 
and control nonfinancial firms. 
b.  Nonfinancial Firms Owning Banks measures restrictions on the ability of nonfinancial 
firms to own and control banks 
                                                 
6 Of the 107 responses received, 13 were received in November 1998, 65 were received in 1999, and 29 in 2000, with 19 of 
the latter received in either January or February. 
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Restrictions on Bank Activities: includes restrictions on securities, insurance, and real 
estate activities plus restrictions on the banks owning and controlling nonfinancial firms.  
3. Competition Regulatory Variables.  
a.  Limitations on Foreign Bank Entry/Ownership: whether there are any limitations placed 
on the ownership of domestic banks by foreign banks and whether there are any limitations 
placed on the ability of foreign banks to enter the domestic banking industry. If there are 
any limitations, this variable is assigned a value of 1 and a value of 0 otherwise.  
b. Entry into Banking Requirements: measures the specific legal requirements for obtaining 
a license to operate as a bank.  
c.  Fraction of Entry Applications Denied: fraction of applications denied. 
(1) Foreign Denials: fraction of foreign applications denied. 
(2) Domestic Denials: fraction of domestic applications denied.  
4. Capital Regulatory Variables. We use three measures of capital regulatory stringency. 
a.  Overall Capital Stringency measures the extent of regulatory requirements regarding the 
amount of capital banks must hold.  
b.  Initial Capital Stringency measures whether the source of funds that count as regulatory 
capital can include assets other than cash or government securities, borrowed funds, and 
whether the regulatory/supervisory authorities verify the sources of capital.  
c.  Capital Regulatory Index incorporates the previous two measures of capital stringency.  
5. Official Supervisory Action Variables. 
a.  Official Supervisory Power measures the extent to which official supervisory authorities 
have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems. 
We also decompose this variable into three constituent parts: 
(1) Prompt Corrective Power measures the extent to which the law establishes pre-
determined levels of bank solvency deterioration that forces automatic enforcement 
actions, such as intervention, and the extent to which supervisors have the requisite, 
suitable powers to do so. 
(2) Restructuring Power measures the extent to which supervisory authorities have the 
power to restructure and reorganize troubled banks. 
(3) Declaring Insolvency Power measures the extent to which supervisory authorities have 
the power to declare a deeply troubled bank insolvent. 
b. Supervisory Forbearance Discretion measures the degree to which supervisory authorities 
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other imprudent behavior on the part of banks.  
c. Loan Classification Stringency measures the degree to which loans that are in arrears must 
be classified as sub-standard, doubtful, or loss. 
d. Provisioning Stringency measures the degree to which a bank must provision against a loan 
that is classified first as sub-standard, then as doubtful, and lastly as loss. 
e. Diversification Index measures whether regulations support geographical asset 
diversification. It is based on two variables: 
(1) Diversification Guidelines: whether there are there explicit, verifiable, and quantifiable 
guidelines for asset diversification. 
(2) No Foreign Loans: whether banks are prohibited from making loans abroad.  
6. Official Supervisory Experience and Structure. We attempt to measure the experience and 
structure of the supervisory regime with the following variables: 
a.  Supervisor Tenure: equals the average years of tenure of professional bank supervisors. 
b. Independence of Supervisory Authority-Overall: measures the degree to which the 
supervisory authority is independent. 
1. Independence of Supervisory Authority-Political: measures the degree to 
which the supervisory authority is independent from the government. 
2. Independence of Supervisory Authority-Banks: measures the degree to which 
the supervisory authority is independent from lawsuits from banks and others. 
c.  Multiple Supervisors: indicates whether there is a single official regulatory of banks, or 
whether multiple supervisor share responsibility for supervising the nation’s banks. This 
variable is assigned a value of 1 if there is more than one supervisor and 0 otherwise. 
7. Private Monitoring Variables. We measure private-sector monitoring with four indicators.  
a.  Certified Audit Required: This variable captures whether an outside licensed audit is 
required of the financial statements issued by a bank. Such an audit would presumably 
indicate the presence or absence of an independent assessment of the accuracy of financial 
information released to the public. 
b.  Percent of 10 Biggest Banks Rated by International Rating Agencies: The percentage of 
the top 10 banks that are rated by international credit-rating agencies. The greater the 
percentage, the more the public may be aware of the overall condition of the banking 
industry as viewed by an independent third party. 
c.  No Explicit Deposit Insurance Scheme: takes a value of 1 if there is an explicit deposit 
insurance scheme, and 0 otherwise. Lower values indicate more private monitoring.  
d.  Bank Accounting: this variable takes a value of 1 when the income statement includes 
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to produce consolidated financial statements. 
e.  Private Monitoring Index: includes (a), (b) [which equals 1 if the percentage is 100; 0 
otherwise], (c), and (d). In addition, three other measures are included in the index based on 
‘yes or no’ answers. Specifically, a 1 is assigned if off-balance sheet items are disclosed to 
the public; if banks must disclose risk management procedures to the public; and if 
subordinated debt is allowable (required) as a part of regulatory capital. Higher values 
indicating more private oversight.  
8.  Deposit Insurance Scheme Variables. Three variables capture deposit insurance regime: 
a.  Deposit Insurer Power: based on the assignment of 1 (yes) or 0 (no) values to three 
questions assessing whether the deposit insurance authority has the authority: (1) to make 
the decision to intervene in a bank, (2) to take legal action against bank directors or 
officials, or (3) has ever taken any legal action against bank directors or officers. The sum 
of the assigned values ranges from 0 to 3, with higher values indicating more power.  
b.  Deposit Insurance Funds-to-Total Bank Assets: the size of the deposit insurance fund 
relative to total bank assets. In the case of the U.S. savings and loan debacle during the 
1980s, the insurance agency itself reported insolvency. This severely limited its ability to 
effectively resolve failed savings and loan institutions in a timely manner [Barth (1991)].  
c.  Moral Hazard Index: based on Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), who used 
principal components to capture the presence and design features of explicit deposit 
insurance systems, with the latter including: no coinsurance, foreign currency deposits 
covered, interbank deposits covered, type of funding, source of funding, management, 
membership, and the level of explicit coverage. Higher values imply greater moral hazard.  
9.  Market Structure Indicators 
a.  Bank Concentration: the fraction of deposits held by the five largest banks. 
b. Foreign-Owned Banks: fraction of system’s assets that are 50% or more foreign owned. 
c.  Government-Owned Banks: fraction of system’s assets 50% or more government owned. 
10. Outcomes:
7 
a.  Bank Development: equals claims on the private sector by deposit money banks as a share 
of GDP and is the average value over the 1997-99 period.
8  
b.  Net Interest Margin: equals net interest income divided by total assets, 1997.  
c.  Overhead Costs: equals total bank overhead costs as a share of total banks assets, 1997.  
                                                 
7 For bank development, we update Levine, Loayza, and Beck, (2000). The net interest margin and overhead cost variables 
are from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2001). Nonperforming loans are from this paper’s survey. 
8 We average over the 1997-99 period to smooth business cycle fluctuations and obtain the same results using 1999 data. 
  14d.  Nonperforming Loans: nonperforming loans as a share of total assets, 1999.  
e.  Crisis: whether a country suffered a major banking crisis according to Caprio-Klingebiel 
(1999) during the 1990s or late 1980s. 
III.C. Indexes 
We use two methods to construct indexes of regulations and supervisory practices that 
incorporate the answers to several questions from our survey, with the specific questions listed in 
Table 1. First, many of the questions can be specified as simple zero/one variables. Thus, our first 
method simply sums the individual zero/one answers. This method gives equal weight to each of the 
questions in constructing the index. The second method involves the construction of the first principal 
component of the underlying questions. In constructing this component, the factor analytic procedure 
produces a principal component with mean zero and standard deviation one. An advantage of this 
method is that equal weights for the individual questions are not specified. A disadvantage is that it is 
less transparent how a change in the response to a question changes the index.  
We only report the results using the principal component indexes. Nevertheless, we have 
confirmed all this paper’s conclusions using both methods. 
III.D. Summary Statistics 
There is great cross-country, cross-regional, and cross-income group diversity in bank 
regulatory and supervisory practices. For instance, many countries - such as Australia, Austria, 
Germany, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Zambia - impose no restrictions on the ability of 
banks to engage in securities activities (Securities Activities). In contrast, Cambodia, China, and 
Vietnam prohibit banks or their subsidiaries from conducting securities activities. More generally, 
poorer countries place tighter restrictions on bank activities than richer countries. Also, some countries 
during the year prior to the survey had no new banks, including Chile, Egypt, Korea, and Gambia. 
Other countries had more than 25 new banks, such as the United States, Italy, India, Switzerland, 
Netherlands, Japan, Germany, and Romania. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001b) illustrate additional 
cross-country differences.  
This paper’s main messages are contained in Table 2’s correlations. These are as follows:  
First, the percentage of the banking system owned by the government (Government-Owned 
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Activities), positively associated with the percentage of entry applications denied  (Entry Applications 
Denied), positively associated with prohibitions against making foreign loans (No Foreign Loans), and 
negatively associated with regulatory variables that promote private monitoring of banks (Private 
Monitoring Index). Thus, greater government ownership is associated with policies that restrict bank 
activities, reduce bank competition, erect barriers to international financial integration, and impede 
private-sector corporate control of banks. Such ownership is not associated with either stricter capital 
regulations (Capital Regulatory Index) or greater prompt corrective power (Prompt Corrective Power 
Index). 
Second, we do not observe the simple regulatory/supervisory tradeoffs stressed by many 
theoretical models. For instance, we expected to find that countries that adopt generous deposit 
insurance regimes (high values of the Moral Hazard Index) would also have powerful official 
supervisors, extensive prompt corrective powers, stringent capital requirements, extensive private 
monitoring, and perhaps greater restrictions on bank activities to ameliorate the bad incentives 
associated with generous deposit insurance. We did not confirm these expectations, however. 
Although the generosity of the deposit insurance regime is significantly correlated with the stringency 
of capital regulations, it is not significantly correlated with indexes of Prompt Corrective Power, 
Official Supervisory Power, Private Monitoring, or Restrictions on Bank Activities. Similarly, we did 
not find that countries with higher levels of the Private Monitoring Index had correspondingly lower 
levels of Official Supervisory Power. 
Third, while not uniform, the correlations suggest that countries tend to take either an open, 
private-sector oriented approach to regulation and supervision, or a more closed, government-
controlled approach. Thus, the Private Monitoring Index is negatively associated with the Entry into 
Banking Requirements Index, Restrictions on Bank Activities, and Government Ownership. In turn, 
the Entry Applications Denied is positively associated with Restrictions on Bank Activity and No 
Foreign Loans. 
Fourth, the correlations are consistent with the view that countries with more open, private-
sector-oriented approaches to regulation and supervision tend to have greater bank development, 
better performance and more stable banks. Specifically, better developed banks as measured by 
greater Bank Development are associated with higher levels of the Private Monitoring Index, fewer 
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Government Ownership. Similarly, more efficient banking systems (as measured by lower levels of 
the Net Interest Margin index) are associated with higher levels of the Private Monitoring Index, 
fewer Restrictions on Bank Activities, and lower levels of Government Ownership. We also find 
that bank Overhead Costs are negatively correlated with (i) ease of bank entry (Entry into Banking 
Requirements Index), (ii) greater Private Monitoring, and (iii) less Government Ownership. Finally, 
Major Banking Crises are much more frequent in countries with generous deposit insurance (Moral 
Hazard Index) and extensive government ownership of the banking industry. 
Fifth, the correlations are consistent with the view that government corruption (lower levels of 
Government Integrity) tends to be higher in countries where the government plays a large role in 
supervising, regulating, and owning banks. In particular, corruption is associated with powerful 
official supervision (Official Supervisory Power), weak private-sector monitoring, limited entry 
(Entry Applications Denied), restricted foreign loans, high levels of government ownership of banks, 
restricted bank activities, and weak capital regulations.
9  
These correlation results are informative but due to their bivariate nature they do not control 
for other aspects of regulation and supervision. We therefore explore whether these relationships 
change when simultaneously including a variety of regulations and supervisory practices.  
IV. Regression Results 
IV.A. Banking sector outcomes and regulation / supervision: Multivariate Analyses 
Tables 3 and 4 present our basic regression results when simultaneously including a wide 
range of bank regulation/supervision indicators. There are two types of regressions. First, we use 
ordinary least squares regressions to examine the relationships between bank outcomes and bank 
regulation and supervision. In these regressions, we regress each of the four outcome variables (Bank 
                                                 
9 Note, in early versions of this paper, we examined whether particular types of regulations and supervisory practices are 
positively associated with government corruption.  We did indeed find a very strong, positive relationship between 
corruption and countries with powerful supervisory agencies, tight restrictions on bank activities, entry barriers that limit 
competition and a negative relationship between corruption and countries that promote private-sector monitoring of banks 
when (i) controlling for many other country characteristics and (ii) using instrumental variables, but do not pursue this line 
of investigation here because it is tangential to the paper’s main message. 
  17Development, Net Interest Margin, Overhead Costs, and Nonperforming Loans) on various 
supervisory and regulatory indicators. Since La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) 
find that legal origin helps account for cross-country differences in financial development, we also 
include legal origin dummy variables as exogenous control variables. The legal origin variables 
jointly enter all of the Table 3 regressions significantly. The results do not depend on including these 
controls, however.  Moreover we obtain the same results when controlling for religious composition 
and latitudinal distance from the equator, which some theories suggest influence financial 
development (Stulz and Williamson, 2002; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2002).
10  
Second, Table 4 presents logit regressions that examine the relationships between banking 
crises and bank regulation and supervision. Since many consider macroeconomic instability to be an 
important determinant of banking crises, we include the average inflation rate during the five years 
prior to the crisis in countries that experienced a banking crisis. In countries that did not, we include 
the average inflation rate during the five years prior to the survey, 1993-1997. In many cases, we 
include interaction terms to examine whether the association of one regulatory or supervisory indicator 
with bank stability depends on other aspects of regulation and supervision. 
We organize the discussion around each of the specific issues discussed in Section II. 
Furthermore, in each case, we focus on only one or two key regulatory/supervisory variables. For 
example, when discussing banking powers, we focus on Restrictions on Bank Activities, which is an 
aggregate measure of restrictions on bank activities. Nevertheless, we examined each of the 
components of the indexes (see Appendix available on request). In cases where the individual 
components produce different results from the aggregate index, we discuss these below.  
                                                 
10 There are five possible legal origins: English Common Law, French Civil Law, German Civil Law, Scandinavian Civil 
Code, and Socialist/Communist Law. To assess whether there is an independent association between bank 
development/performance and bank regulations and supervisory practices, we include dummy variables for each country’s 
legal origin (except the Scandinavian law countries). Legal origin is the source of the Company Law or Commercial Code 
for each country. Note, due to data limitations, there are some regressions in which there are no Socialist legal origin 
countries. To measure religious composition, we the  measure of the percentage of the population in each country that is 
Roman Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, or belongs to “other denominations.”  The numbers are in percent and sum to 100 (so 
we omit Protestant from the regressions). Latitude is measured as the (absolute value) of the latitudinal distance from the 
equator. 
  181. Regulations on bank activities and mixing banking-commerce 
Table 3 indicates that restricting bank activities is negatively associated with bank 
development, but there is not a robust link between regulatory restrictions on bank activities and net 
interest margins or overhead costs. The negative association between restrictions on bank activities and 
bank development holds while controlling for capital regulations, official supervisory power, the 
private-monitoring index, regulations on the entry of banks, and government ownership of banks. Bank 
development is a particularly important indicator because it is positively associated with economic 
growth (King and Levine, 1993a,b; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000). 
The size of the coefficient is economically large. For instance, the coefficients suggest that in a 
country like Egypt that imposes tight restrictions on bank activities (i.e., its value is more than one 
standard deviation above the mean, 1.2) a loosening of these restrictions to the sample mean (0) is 
associated with an increase in bank development of 0.14(=1.2*0.118). This means Egypt’s bank 
development increases from 0.49 to 0.63, which is about the level in Italy (whose restrictions index 
equals the mean). We do not present this as an exploitable policy experiment but rather as an indicator 
of the economic size of the coefficient. We also examine the individual components of the aggregate 
Restrictions on Bank Activities index. The results indicate that restricting banks from engaging in 
securities activities is strongly, negatively associated with bank development. 
The results also indicate that restricting bank activities is associated with an increase in the 
likelihood of suffering a major crisis (Table 4). In the full sample, we find a weak, positive relationship 
between the likelihood of a crisis and restricting bank activities (Regression 1). The ability of banks to 
stabilize income flows by diversifying activities, however, may only work in countries with sufficient 
securities market development. When restricting the sample to countries for which the World Bank has 
been able to collect at least some data on stock market transactions, we find that greater regulatory 
restrictions are indeed strongly, positively associated with the likelihood of suffering a crisis 
(Regression 2). The other regressions in Table 4 do not restrict the sample. Somewhat anomalously, 
regulatory restrictions on bank activities are not positively associated with non-performing loans. 
While diversifying across non-loan making activities is positively associated with bank stability (Table 
4), diversification into non-loan making lines of business does not translate into higher quality loans 
(Table 3). In sum, while recognizing this result on non-performing loans, the crisis regressions are 
consistent with the view that diversification of income through nontraditional activities is positively 
  19associated with bank stability, especially in economies with active nonbank-financial markets.
11 
We examine whether restricting bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce is 
associated with positive outcomes under specific conditions. For example, Boyd, Chang, and Smith’s 
(1998) model predicts that restricting bank activities may reduce financial fragility in the presence of 
generous deposit insurance. Thus, we entered an interaction term into the regressions in Table 3 and 
Table 4 that equals Restrictions on Bank Activities * Moral Hazard Index, where Moral Hazard Index 
is the Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) measure of deposit insurance generosity. The 
conclusions do not change. Restrictions on Bank Activities retains its negative association with bank 
development, and its positive association with the likelihood of a crisis, while the interaction term is 
not significant. Similarly, some argue that in weak institutional environments – environments where 
the public sector lacks the ability to monitor banks (either because of weak Official Supervisory 
Powers, absence of Prompt Corrective Powers, or insufficient Capital Regulations) - it is important to 
restrict bank activities. When we include interaction terms for these variables, we again find no support 
for this contention.
12 We do not find any support for more subtle theories regarding the efficacy of 
restricting bank activities. Thus, the bank fragility results remain broadly consistent with the view that 
there are diversification benefits from allowing banks to engage in non-traditional activities. These 
conclusions must be tempered, however, by the fact that with such diversification one would have 
expected to find a positive correlation between restrictions on bank activities and both overhead costs 
and nonperforming loans. But this is not the case (Table 3). 
                                                 
11 We collected historical data on restrictions on bank activities.  For each country that experienced a major banking crisis, 
we identified the country’s policies toward bank activities prior to the crisis. Using pre-crisis policies strengths this paper’s 
conclusions.  The vast majority of countries that experienced a crisis did not change their policies.  In the few cases that did 
change, virtually all of them changed toward removing restrictions on bank activities after the crisis. Thus, using current 
observations biases the results against those that we report (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2001a). 
12 We also experimented with an interaction term that equals Restrictions on Bank Activities * Corrupt. The reason is that 
some may argue that in corrupt environments it is important to limit the range of permissible bank activities. Our results do 
not support this suspicion. We continue to find a negative association between Restrictions on Bank Activities and both 
bank performance and stability when including Restrictions on Bank Activities*Corrupt, with this interaction term entering 
insignificantly. All these results are in an Appendix that is available upon request. 
  202. Regulations on domestic and foreign bank entry 
Table 3 indicates that tighter restrictions on entry into banking are positively associated with 
overhead costs, but there is not a significant link between entry restrictions on net interest margins. 
Furthermore, the relationship between overhead costs and restricting entry is economically small. For 
instance, a one standard deviation increase in the Entry into Banking Requirements Index is associated 
with an increase in Overhead Costs of only 0.003 (=1*0.003), which is small insofar as the mean value 
is 0.039 and the standard deviation is 0.023.
13 
Table 4 indicates that in several regressions the likelihood of a major banking crisis is 
positively associated with greater Limitations on Foreign Bank Entry/Ownership. We find that foreign-
bank ownership per se is not associated with the likelihood of a crisis. Rather, it is limitations on 
foreign-bank entry and ownership that are positively associated with bank fragility. 
We examine whether restricting bank entry is associated with favorable outcomes in particular 
environments. Specifically, we assess whether there are positive associations between bank outcomes 
and restricting bank entry - both domestic and foreign bank entry - with weak official supervision. We 
examine the following interaction terms: (Entry into Banking Regulations)*(Official Supervisory 
Power), (Limitations on Foreign Bank Entry/Ownership)*(Entry into Banking Regulations), and 
(Limitations on Foreign Bank Entry/Ownership)*(Official Supervisory Power). We find no evidence 
of favorable relationships between restricting bank entry and bank development, performance or 
stability under any of these conditions. 
3. Regulations on capital adequacy  
Table 3’s results do not suggest a strong, independent relationship between capital regulatory 
stringency and bank development, net interest margins, or overhead cost when controlling for other 
regulations and supervisory practices. While capital stringency is positively correlated with bank 
development (Table 2), this relationship is not robust to controlling for other supervisory and 
regulatory policies. In terms of bank stability, there is a significantly negative relationship between 
                                                 
13 Note, although regulatory restrictions on competition are significantly positively associated with overhead costs, we did 
not find a significant relationship between overhead costs and the actual level of bank concentration. Specifically, when we 
include bank concentration in the Table 3 regressions instead of the Entry into Banking Requirements Index, bank 
concentration is not significantly associated with overhead costs. 
  21capital stringency and nonperforming loans. However, when examining banking crises, there are some 
specifications in which capital stringency enters with a negative and significant coefficient (Table 4). 
Yet, alterations in the conditioning information set suggest that this relationship is not very robust. 
Thus, the evidence is somewhat mixed.  While more stringent capital regulations are associated with 
fewer nonperforming loans, capital stringency is not robustly linked with banking crises or bank 
development or efficiency when controlling for other supervisory/ regulatory policies. 
As we discussed above, there is a rich theoretical literature on bank capital requirements 
indicating that particular settings influence their desirability and effect. Consequently, we also examine 
whether more stringent requirements are positively associated with favorable banking-sector outcomes 
in particular regulatory/supervisory environments. In particular, strict capital adequacy regulations may 
be especially important in countries with generous deposit insurance schemes. We find no evidence for 
the proposition that capital regulations ameliorate the risk-taking incentives produced by generous 
deposit insurance (see regression 9, Table 4). Similarly, capital regulations may be especially 
important in countries with weak Official Supervisory Powers, or a regulatory environment that does 
not spur Private Monitoring. Yet, when we include these interaction terms, we find no evidence for 
these more subtle theories of the effectiveness of capital regulation. 
These results do not suggest that bank capital is unimportant for bank fragility. They do, 
however, suggest that there is not a strong relationship between the stringency of official capital 
requirements and the likelihood of a crisis after controlling for other features of the regulatory and 
supervisory regime. These results may help inform the evolution of the Basel II Capital Accord. 
4. Deposit insurance design 
We find a positive association between the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and 
bank fragility (Table 4). This is consistent with recent work by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2002). The positive relationship, moreover, is robust to alterations in the control variables as we show 
below. This result is consistent with the view that deposit insurance not only substantially aggravates 
moral hazard but also produces deleterious effects on bank stability.
14  
                                                 
14 We examined the link between the moral hazard index and bank development, though this is not shown in Table 3 to save 
space. We did not find a strong association between the generosity of the deposit insurance system (Moral Hazard Index) 
  22Importantly, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) use annual data to show that deposit 
insurance generosity predicts future banking crises. They, however, were unable to control for other 
features of the regulatory/supervisory environment because these data were unavailable. We find that 
deposit insurance generosity is positively associated with the likelihood of a crisis while controlling for 
many features of regulation and supervision. Given that we do not have time-series data, however, we 
are not able to assess whether deposit insurance generosity predicts future banking crises. 
The relationship between deposit insurance and bank fragility is economically large. For 
instance, using regression 3 (Table 4) we can compute the drop in the probability of a banking crisis 
for Mexico. When its quite generous deposit insurance scheme (3.9) is reduced to the sample mean of 
0, then Mexico’s probability of a crisis falls by 12 percentage points, using Mexico’s values for all the 
variables in regression 3. Again, we stress that our study does not identify an exploitable relationship. 
This illustrative example simply confirms the Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) conclusion that 
the adverse incentive effects created by generous schemes may be economically substantial. 
Some suggest that strong official oversight and stringent capital requirements can mitigate the 
moral hazard created by a generous deposit insurance scheme. Others disagree, believing these do not 
work. We find that official supervisory power and tighter capital regulations do not mitigate the 
negative relationship between generous deposit insurance and bank fragility (Table 4). However, 
better-developed private property rights - as proxied by greater adherence to the rule of law (Rule of 
Law) – and greater political openness (Political Openness) do mitigate the negative association of 
moral hazard and bank fragility.
15  It is worth noting, however, that the generosity of deposit insurance 
is positively associated with the probability of suffering a crisis even in countries with the highest Rule 
of Law values (e.g., the cross-over point is Rule of Law =7.4, but the maximum Rule of Law value is 
6). Thus, while greater Rule of Law reduces the negative association of generous deposit insurance, it 
does not eliminate it. Furthermore, while many stress tighter official supervision and more stringent 
capital requirements as the antidote to generous deposit insurance, we find little evidence to support 
this advice. 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
and bank development or efficiency. Later, when using instrumental variables, we present these results (Table 5). 
15 The Rule of Law is an indicator of the degree to which the country adheres to the rule of law. It ranges from 0 to 6 with 
higher values indicating greater confidence in the legal system to settle disputes. It is obtained from the International 
Country Risk Guide and is averaged over 1990-1999.  
  235. Supervision 
We do not find a strong association between bank development and performance and official 
supervisory power (see Table 3). Specifically, the overall official supervisory power indicator is not 
related to bank development or bank efficiency or the level of nonperforming loans. Declaring 
insolvency power is also unrelated to development or efficiency. The prompt corrective power 
indicator is negatively related to bank development (but these results are not robust to changes in the 
conditioning information set or to controlling for the degree of political openness).
16 There is also 
some weak evidence that supervisory forbearance discretion is positively related to bank efficiency 
(but this is not robust either). There is, however, a positive association between supervisory tenure and 
bank development. Supervisory independence, loan classification stringency, liquidity requirements, 
diversification guidelines, and restrictions on making loans abroad are not related to bank development 
or efficiency or the level of nonperforming loans. In sum, those features that constitute official “core” 
supervision are not strongly associated with bank development, bank efficiency, and the level of 
nonperforming loans in a convincing manner. 
In terms of banking crises, the same basic message emerges with only one exception (Table 4). 
Official supervisory powers – and the assortment of Official Supervisory Action Variables and Official 
Supervisory Experience and Structure Variables defined above – are not statistically related to the 
probability of suffering a systemic crisis.  
The one exception involves the diversification index (which aggregates diversification 
guidelines and the absence of restrictions on making loans abroad). There is a negative relationship 
between the diversification index and the likelihood of suffering a major crisis in small economies. 
                                                 
16 Additional results, available upon request, indicate that Official Supervisory Power has less of a negative relationship to 
bank development in politically open economies (i.e., those countries is which the government does not repress the media 
and there is greater private-sector ownership of the media). The results imply that in a country like Korea with an 
intermediate level of political openness (Political Openness is approximately 0), a one standard deviation increase in 
Official Supervisory Power would be associated with a decrease in bank development of 0.09 (=1*0.092). This is a large 
enough change to move from Korea’s high level of bank development (0.73) down toward that of Chile’s (0.63), which is 
near the sample average. In contrast, the same increase in official supervisory power in France (where the Political 
Openness variable equals 2.7) would actually be associated with an increase in bank development, +0.07 (= -0.09*1 + 
0.06*2.7*1). Thus, official supervisory power is particularly harmful to bank development in countries with closed political 
systems. This raises a cautionary flag toward current efforts by international financial institutions to boost supervisory 
power in developing countries. However, Political Openness does not mitigate the pernicious effect of any of the other 
regulatory/supervisory variables, such as Restrictions on Bank Activities, Prompt Corrective Action Power, No Foreign 
Loans, or Government Ownership of Banks. The political openness variable is based on the openness of the media, both 
print and broadcast. 
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the diversification index multiplied by the logarithm of real per capita GDP in 1995 (these are 
Purchasing Power Parity adjusted figures from the Penn World Tables.). As shown in Table 4, 
diversification is negatively associated with the likelihood of a crisis but diversification guidelines 
have less of a stabilizing effect in bigger countries. The cut-off is high; diversification guidelines have 
stabilizing effects in all but the nine largest countries. 
One may, of course, argue that we do not have sufficiently detailed information on: (a) 
regulations and supervisory practices, (b) their actual implementation (except that independence may 
proxy for the vigor with which policies are implemented), or (c) the transparency and accountability of 
the regulatory/supervisory process to evaluate cross-country differences in regulation and supervision. 
While sympathetic to this criticism, we do note that this paper’s data on regulations and supervisory 
practices is more extensive than any existing study. Thus, while by no means definitive, these initial 
findings augment our understanding of the relationships between bank supervision and regulation and 
banking sector development, performance, and stability. 
6. Regulations on easing private-sector monitoring of banks 
Private monitoring is strongly, positively associated with bank development and negatively 
associated with net interest margins and the level of nonperforming loans (Table 3). While private 
monitoring is negatively correlated with overhead costs (Table 2), the link between private monitoring 
and overhead costs is not robust to controlling for other regulatory and supervisory policies (Table 3). 
The relationship between bank development and private monitoring seems economically large. For 
instance, a one standard deviation increase in the Private Monitoring Index in a country like 
Bangladesh with both weak private monitoring and low bank development (0.28), is associated with an 
increase in bank development of about 32% (= (0.09*1/0.28)*100). We again stress the purely 
illustrative nature of this experiment. There is a negative association between private monitoring and 
overhead costs, but it becomes insignificant when controlling for government ownership.  
In terms of crises, there is no significant association between private-sector monitoring and the 
likelihood of a banking crisis when controlling for other variables (Table 4). Since capital regulations 
are a possible vehicle for encouraging prudent behavior by banks, we decided to exclude the capital 
regulation index from the crisis regressions. Eliminating this index does not change the results, 
  25however. This finding is contrary to predictions about the positive role of private-sector monitoring in 
fostering banking stability and a puzzle given the positive link between private-sector monitoring and 
banking sector development (Table 3). 
The results are consistent with view that those countries facilitating private-sector monitoring 
of banks have better performing banks than those less focused on empowering private-sector corporate 
control of banks. This is consistent with the goal of the third pillar in the Basel II Capital Accord. 
However, we did not find a robust link between private-sector monitoring and bank fragility. While 
recognizing this puzzle, the results, taken together with those of official supervisory power, are less 
consistent with theories emphasizing direct government oversight and more consistent with theories 
emphasizing private-sector corporate control. 
7. Government ownership of banks 
Table 3 indicates that government ownership is positively related to the level of nonperforming 
loans but not robustly linked with the other indicators of bank development and performance when 
controlling for bank regulation and supervision. We also do not find a strong, positive relationship 
between government ownership and the likelihood of a crisis (Table 4). These results do not confirm 
those in Caprio and Martinez (2000), who find that government ownership is significantly associated 
with increases in bank fragility using panel data. Due to data limitations, they are unable to control for 
other features of regulation and supervision. In contrast to their work, however, while we control for 
other features, we have only examined cross-country relationships because we do not have time-series 
observations on the regulatory and supervisory variables. 
Overall, we do not find that greater government ownership of banks is associated with lower 
banking sector development, efficiency, and stability when controlling for the regulatory and 
supervisory environment (Table 3). We do, however, find a strong negative correlation between 
government ownership and bank development, efficiency, and stability (Table 2).
17 These results 
suggest that the bank regulations and supervisory practices are closely associated with the degree of 
government ownership of banks.  Thus, when we include regulations and supervisory practices 
                                                 
17 Note, in a simple regression of bank development or efficiency on government ownership while controlling for the legal 
origins dummy variables, government ownership enters significantly. 
  26together in the same regression with government ownership, the induced multi-collinearity produces 
insignificant coefficients on government ownership. This is supported by our earlier finding that 
government ownership is positively associated with tighter restrictions on bank activities, restrictions 
on bank entry, prohibitions on foreign loans, and negatively associated with private-monitoring. 
IV.B. Bank development and regulation / supervision: Causality Issues  
The empirical results from the simple correlations and multivariate regressions do not control 
for the potential endogeneity of bank regulations and supervisory practices. To control for potential 
simultaneity bias, we use instrumental variables to identify the exogenous component of supervision 
and regulation.  Given the paucity of instruments and the extensive list of regulations and supervisory 
practices examined, we consider each regulatory and supervisory sequentially.  That is, instead of the 
multivariate analyses presented in Table 3, we regress bank development on each regulatory and 
supervisory indicator while instrumenting for the regulation or supervision indicator.  
To select instrumental variables for the regulatory and supervisory variables, we use theory and 
recent empirical work. First, some argue that religious composition may shape governmental 
approaches to regulation and supervision. According to Landes (1998), the Catholic and Muslim 
religions tend to generate hierarchical bonds of authority that shape the structure of government 
institutions. Stulz and Williamson (2002) provide empirical support for this view. Thus, we include 
measures of religious composition as instrumental variables. Second, as discussed and tested in Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2002) and Easterly and Levine (2002), some argue that countries in poor 
climates – tropical climates – tend to produce exploitative political regimes that gear governmental 
institutions toward protecting a small elite.  Thus, endowments may influence a broad array of 
institutions, including bank regulatory and supervisory institutions.  We use latitudinal distance from 
the equator an instrument. Finally, legal origin variables are included as instruments. LLSV (1998) 
argue that civil law and socialist law countries will tend to support stronger governments relative to 
private property to a greater degree than common law countries. Thus, legal origin may also influence 
a country’s approach to bank regulation and supervision. These instrumental variables are defined 
above.  Critically, the first stage regressions always reject the null hypothesis that they do not explain 
any of the cross-country variation in the regulatory and supervisory variables. Thus, these instrumental 
variables explain cross-country variation in bank regulations and supervisory practices. 
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parameter estimates.  Specifically, we use a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator (Two-
stage least squares produce the same results) that is robust to heteroskedasticity. The GMM estimator 
amounts to imposing the set orthogonality conditions that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated 
with the error term. The economic meaning of these conditions is that the instrumental variables only 
affect the dependent variable through the explanatory variables.  In the context of the Table 5 
regressions, this implies that the instrumental variables affect bank development only through the bank 
regulatory/supervisory variables.  We test this condition.  The Hansen (1982) test of the 
overidentifying restrictions (OIR-test) assesses whether the instrumental variables are associated with 
bank development beyond their ability to explain bank regulations or supervisory practices. The test 
statistic is simply the sample size times the value attained for the objective function at the GMM 
estimate. Under the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with the error term, the test 
is distributed as χ
2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number instruments minus the number of 
regressors. If the data do not reject the null hypothesis– if the specification passes the OIR-test – then 
the data do not reject the validity of the instrumental variables. That is, failure to reject the OIR-test 
implies a failure to reject the estimated coefficient on bank regulation/supervision as indicating an 
effect running from bank regulation/supervision to bank development. 
Table 5 presents the instrumental variable results. They confirm three major findings from 
Table 3’s ordinary least squares multivariate analysis: (a) restrictions on bank activities are negatively 
associated with bank development, (b) regulations that boost private monitoring are positively 
associated with bank development, and (c) the Official Supervisory Power index is not significantly 
linked with bank development. Furthermore, the regressions do not reject the test of the over-
identifying restrictions; thus, the data do not reject the validity of the instruments. Also, the 
instruments significantly account for cross-country variation in the supervisor/regulatory indicators in 
the first-stage regressions. When moving from the multivariate approach that simultaneously controls 
for many regulatory/supervisory features to the bivariate, instrumental variable analyses in Table 5, 
some differences emerge.  Table 5 indicates that when we do not control for many 
regulatory/supervisory characteristics, we find that (1) limitations on foreign bank entry and the more 
frequently denial of entry applications are associated with poor bank development, (2) more stringent 
capital requirements are associated with higher levels of bank development, (3) prompt corrective 
action power, restrictions on foreign loans, and government ownership of bank are all negatively 
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18  These results emphasize that regulation/supervision cannot be 
taken in isolation. In terms of the stringency of capital requirements, Table 5 indicates a positive link 
between capital requirements and bank development when not controlling for other policies.  However, 
the (a) positive correlation between capital requirements and regulations that promote private-sector 
monitoring and the (b) negative correlation between capital requirements and restrictions on bank 
activities (Table 2) imply that the stringency of capital regulations do not enjoy an independent link 
with bank development when controlling for these other policies (Table 3).  More broadly, government 
ownership of banks is positively associated with the restrictions on the denial of entry into banking and 
prohibitions on making loans abroad and negatively associated with regulations that foster private-
monitoring (Table 2), so that government ownership does not enter into the multivariate regression 
significantly (Table 4) but does enter the bivariate regression significantly (Table 5). 
Thus, this attempt to control for simultaneity does not substantively alter the tentative 
interpretation of our findings: countries that adopt an approach to bank regulation and supervision that 
spurs private-sector monitoring enjoy greater bank development than those that adopt an approach that 
stresses official restrictions on banks, powerful official oversight of banks, or government ownership 
of banks. We recognize, however, that the power of the OIR-test is weak because it is based on a 
failure to reject a null hypothesis. Thus, we believe that future microeconomic-based evidence that (a) 
more powerfully deals with simultaneity and (b) provides more precise measures of bank performance 
will greatly enhance our understanding of the causal relationship between bank regulation and 
supervision and banking sector outcomes.  
                                                 
18 Note, the differences between the bivariate, instrumental variable results in Table 5 and the multivariate OLS results in 
Table 3 are due to the change from a multivariate to a bivariate set-up.  In particular, applying OLS instead of instrumental 
variables to Table 5 produces very similar results to those reported in Table 3 (available on request). Thus, the differences 
between Table 3 and 5 reflects the simultaneous inclusion of many regulatory/supervisory variables. 
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This paper examines the relationships between a broad array of bank regulations and 
supervisory practices and bank development, performance and stability. We conduct this analysis using 
our unique cross-country database that allows us to assess these interconnected relationships 
simultaneously. Although causality issues remain, the paper nonetheless provides some new, tentative 
empirical evidence on a range of contentious policy issues and theoretical debates. 
First, restricting bank activities is negatively associated with bank development and stability, as 
compared to when banks can diversify into other financial activities. While theory provides conflicting 
predictions about the implications of restricting the range of bank activities, the results are consistent 
with the view that broad banking powers allow banks to diversify income sources and enhance 
stability. As noted, restrictions on bank activities are not positively associated with non-performing 
loans. While diversifying across non-loan making activities is not associated with higher loan quality, 
the results are consistent with the view that diversification of income through nontraditional activities 
is positively associated with bank stability. This finding, moreover, does not appear to be due to 
reverse causality, though much more work needs to be done in this regard. Furthermore, since we 
control for official supervisory practices, capital regulations, regulations on competition, government 
ownership of banks, and the moral hazard engendered by generous deposit insurance schemes, the 
negative relationship between restricting bank activities and bank development and stability does not 
seem to be due to an obvious omitted variable. Furthermore, we find no evidence that restricting bank 
activities is positively associated with favorable banking-sector outcomes in particular 
regulatory/supervisory environments. Specifically, we do not find positive relationships between bank 
development or stability and restrictions on bank activities in economies that offer more generous 
deposit insurance, have weak official supervision, ineffective incentives for private monitoring, or that 
lack stringent capital standards. These results must be qualified, however. We do not find that 
restricting bank activities is positively associated with overhead costs or nonperforming loans. 
Second, although we do not find a strong association between restrictions on bank entry and 
bank efficiency, the results indicate that barriers to foreign-bank entry are positively associated with 
bank fragility. Critically, it is not the actual level of foreign presence (or bank concentration) that 
matters. Instead, it is specific impediments to bank entry that are associated with bank fragility. 
Finally, even when using interaction terms for numerous institutional, regulatory, and policy 
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restrictions on bank entry and banking sector outcomes. 
Third, while the stringency of capital regulations is positively correlated with bank 
development, stringent capital regulations are not closely associated with bank development, 
performance or stability when controlling for other features of the bank regulation and supervision. 
This is consistent with recent studies that offer a cautious assessment of the independent beneficial 
effects of capital regulations. A cautionary note is worth raising, however. While we do not find a 
significant, negative relationship between capital regulations and banking crises, bank development, or 
bank efficiency, we do find that more stringent capital regulations are negatively linked with 
nonperforming loans.  We also examined whether capital regulations are particularly important in 
countries with generous deposit insurance, weak official supervisory agencies, or ineffective 
regulations concerning private-sector monitoring of banks. We find no evidence that capital 
regulations are positively related to favorable banking-sector outcomes in particular institutional or 
policy environments. 
Fourth, generous deposit insurance schemes are strongly and negatively associated with bank 
stability. Many believe that effective regulation and supervision can mitigate the moral hazard 
produced by generous deposit insurance. However, strong official supervisory agencies, stringent 
capital standards, and regulations that encourage private-sector monitoring of banks are not found to 
counterbalance these negative associations of generous deposit insurance. 
Fifth, with but one exception, we do not find a strong relationship between a range of official 
supervisory indicators and bank performance and stability. Thus, measures of supervisory power, 
resources, independence, loan classification stringency, provisioning stringency, and others are not 
robustly associated with bank development, performance or stability. Again, these results do not 
support the strategies of many international agencies that focus on greater official supervisory 
oversight of banks. The one exception involves diversification. There is a negative relationship 
between the diversification index (which aggregates diversification guidelines and the absence of 
restrictions on making loans abroad) and the likelihood of suffering a major crisis, especially in small 
economies. The old adage, “don’t put all your eggs in one basket,” remains relevant for modern 
banking policy.  
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better banking-sector outcomes, i.e., greater bank development, lower net interest margins, and small 
nonperforming loans. This holds even when controlling for many other institutional and policy 
features. However, we did not find that regulations that foster private monitoring reduce the likelihood 
of suffering a major banking crisis. 
Finally, while government ownership of banks is negatively correlated with favorable banking 
outcomes and positively linked with corruption, government ownership of banks does not retain and 
independent, robust association with bank development, efficiency, or stability when controlling for 
other features of the regulatory and supervisory environment. There is no evidence, even in weak 
institutional settings, that government-owned banks are associated with positive outcomes. 
In terms of broad implications, these findings raise a cautionary flag regarding reform strategies 
that place excessive reliance on countries adhering to an extensive checklist of regulations and 
supervisory practices that involve direct, government oversight of and restrictions on banks. Instead, 
our findings are consistent with the view that regulations and supervisory practices that (1) force 
accurate information disclosure, (2) empower private-sector corporate control of banks, and (3) foster 
incentives for private agents to exert corporate control work best to promote bank development, 
performance and stability. Our results do not suggest that official regulation and supervision are 
unimportant.  Indeed, the paper stresses that regulations and supervisory practices that force accurate 
information disclosure and limit the moral hazard incentives of poorly designed deposit insurance 
schemes are positively associated with greater bank development, better performance and increased 
stability. As emphasized and discussed in the Introduction, much work remains.  By constructing a 
new database and conducting some initial analyses, this paper hopes to contribute to our understanding 
of the supervision and regulation of banks. 
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Information on Bank Regulatory, Supervisory and Deposit Insurance Variables 
Variable  Definition  Source and Quantification  World Bank Guide Questions 
  
1.  Bank Activity Regulatory Variables 
   (a) Securities Activities 
The extent to which banks may engage in 
underwriting, brokering and dealing in securities, and 
all aspects of the mutual fund industry. 
OCC and WBG 4.1 (higher values, more restrictive) 
 
Unrestricted = 1 = full range of activities can be 
conducted directly in the bank; Permitted = 2 = full 
range of activities can be conducted, but some or all 
must be conducted in subsidiaries; Restricted = 3 = 
less than full range of activities can be conducted in 
the bank or subsidiaries; and Prohibited = 4 = the 
activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or 
subsidiaries. 
4.1 What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank 
participation in securities activities (the ability of banks to engage 
in the business of securities underwriting, brokering, dealing, and 
all aspects of the mutual fund industry)? 
   (b) Insurance Activities  The extent to which banks may engage in insurance 
underwriting and selling. 
OCC and WBG 4.2 (higher values, more restrictive) 
 
Unrestricted = 1 = full range of activities can be 
conducted directly in the bank; Permitted = 2 = full 
range of activities can be conducted, but some or all 
must be conducted in subsidiaries; Restricted = 3 = 
less than full range of activities can be conducted in 
the bank or subsidiaries; and Prohibited = 4 = the 
activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or 
subsidiaries. 
4.2 What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank 
participation in insurance activities (the ability of banks to engage 
in insurance underwriting and selling)? 
  
   (c) Real Estate Activities  The extent to which banks may engage in real estate 
investment, development and management. 
OCC and WBG 4.3 (higher values, more restrictive) 
 
Unrestricted = 1 = full range of activities can be 
conducted directly in the bank; Permitted = 2 = full 
range of activities can be conducted, but some or all 
must be conducted in subsidiaries; Restricted = 3 = 
less than full range of activities can be conducted in 
the bank or subsidiaries; and Prohibited = 4 = the 
activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or 
subsidiaries. 
4.3 What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank 
participation in real estate activities (the ability of banks to engage 
in real estate investment, development, and management)? 
   
              
2.  Mixing Banking / Commerce Regulatory Variables 
   (a) Bank Owning Nonfinancial Firms  The extent to which banks may own and control 
nonfinancial firms. 
OCC and WBG 4.4 (higher values, more restrictive) 
 
Unrestricted = 1 = a bank may own 100 percent of 
the equity in any nonfinancial firm; Permitted = 2 = a 
bank may own 100 percent of the equity of a 
nonfinancial firm, but ownership is limited based on 
a bank's equity capital; Restricted = 3 = a bank can 
only acquire less than 100 percent of the equity in a 
nonfinancial firm; and Prohibited = 4 = a bank may 
not acquire any equity investment in a nonfinancial 
firm. 
4.4  What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank 
ownership of nonfinancial firms? 
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Variable  Definition  Source and Quantification  World Bank Guide Questions 
   (b) Nonfinancial Firms Owning Banks  The extent to which nonfinancial firms may own and 
control banks. 
OCC and WBG 2.3 (higher values, more restrictive) 
 
Unrestricted = 1 = a nonfinancial firm may own 100 
percent of the equity in a bank; Permitted = 2 = 
unrestricted with prior authorization or approval; 
Restricted = 3 = limits are placed on ownership, such 
as a maximum percentage of a bank's capital or 
shares; and Prohibited = 4 = no equity investment in 
a bank. 
2.3  What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness of ownership by 
nonfinancial firms of banks? 
    
              
3.  Competition Regulatory Variables 
   (a) Limitations on Foreign Bank Entry/Ownership  
Whether foreign banks may own domestic banks and 
whether foreign banks may enter a country's banking 
industry. 
OCC 
Yes = 1; No = 0    
   (b) Entry into Banking Requirements   Whether various types of legal submissions are 
required to obtain a banking license. 
WBG 1.8.1 -1.8.8 
 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
Higher values indicating greater stringency. 
1.8 Which of the following are legally required to be submitted 
before issuance of the banking license? 
1.8.1 Draft by-laws? Yes / No 
1.8.2 Intended organization chart? Yes / No 
1.8.3 Financial projections for first three years? Yes / No 
1.8.4 Financial information on main potential shareholders? Yes / 
No 
1.8.5 Background/experience of future directors? Yes / No 
1.8.6 Background/experience of future managers? Yes / No 
1.8.7 Sources of funds to be disbursed in the capitalization of new 
banks? Yes / No 
1.8.8 Market differentiation intended for the new bank? Yes / No 
   (c) Fraction of Entry Applications Denied  The degree to which applications to enter banking are 
denied.  WBG (1.9.1 + 1.10.1) / (1.9 + 1.10)  (pure number) 
1.9 In the past five years, how many applications for commercial 
banking licenses have been received from domestic entities?               
1.9.1 How many of those applications have been denied? 
1.10 In the past five years, how many applications for commercial 
banking licenses have been received from foreign entities?                  
1.10.1 How many of those applications have been denied? 
        (1) Domestic Denials  The degree to which foreign applications to enter 
banking are denied.  WBG 1.9.1 / 1.9  (pure number) 
1.9 In the past five years, how many applications for commercial 
banking licenses have been received from domestic entities?               
1.9.1 How many of those applications have been denied? 
        (2) Foreign Denials  The degree to which domestic applications to enter 
banking are denied.  WBG 1.10.1 / 1.10  (pure number) 
1.10 In the past five years, how many applications for commercial 
banking licenses have been received from foreign entities?                  
1.10.1 How many of those applications have been denied? 
              
4.  Capital Regulatory Variables 
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Variable  Definition  Source and Quantification  World Bank Guide Questions 
   (a) Overall Capital Stringency 
Whether the capital requirement reflects certain risk 
elements and deducts certain market value losses from 
capital before minimum capital adequacy is 
determined. 
WBG 3.1.1 + 3.3 + 3.9.1 + 3.9.2 + 3.9.3 + (1 if 3.6 < 
0.75) 
 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
Higher values indicating greater stringency. 
3.1.1 Is the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement risk weighted 
in line with the Basel guidelines? Yes / No 
3.3 Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? Yes 
/ No 
3.9.1 Are market value of loan losses not realized in accounting 
books deducted? Yes / No 
3.9.2 Are unrealized losses in securities portfolios deducted? Yes / 
No 
3.9.3 Are unrealized foreign exchange losses deducted? Yes / No 
3.6 What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital? 
   (b) Initial Capital Stringency 
Whether certain funds may be used to initially 
capitalize a bank and whether they are officially 
verified. 
WBG 1.5: Yes = 1, No = 0: WBG 1.6&1.7: Yes=0, 
No=1. 
Higher values indicating greater stringency. 
1.5 Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the 
regulatory/supervisory authorities? Yes / No 
1.6 Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital 
be done with assets other than cash or government securities? Yes / 
No 
1.7 Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed 
funds? Yes / No 
   (c) Capital Regulatory Index      The sum of (a) and (b).  (a) + (b)  
Higher values indicate greater stringency.    
              
5.  Official Supervisory Action Variables 
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   (a) Official Supervisory Power  
Whether the supervisory authorities have the authority 
to take specific actions to prevent and correct 
problems. 
WBG 5.5 + 5.6 + 5.7 + 6.1 + 10.4 + 11.2 + 11.3.1 + 
11.3.2 +11.3.3 + 11.6 + 11.7 + 11.9.1 + 11.9.2 + 
11.9.3  
 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
Sum of these assigned values, with higher values 
indicating greater power. 
5.5 Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with 
external auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the 
bank? Yes / No 
5.6 Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the 
supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank directors or 
senior managers in elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? Yes / 
No 
5.7 Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for 
negligence? Yes / No 
6.1 Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its 
internal organizational structure? Yes / No 
10.4 Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? Yes / No 
11.2  Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors or 
management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential 
losses? Yes / No 
11.3  Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors' decision to 
distribute: 
11.3.1  Dividends?  Yes / No 
11.3.2  Bonuses? Yes / No 
11.3.3  Management fees? Yes / No 
11.6 Can the supervisory agency legally declare-such that this 
declaration supersedes the rights of bank shareholders-that a bank 
is insolvent? Yes / No 
11.7 Does the Banking Law give authority to the supervisory 
agency to  
intervene that is, suspend some or all ownership rights-a problem 
bank? Yes / No 
11.9 Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the 
supervisory agency  
or any other government agency do the following: ? Yes / No 
11.9.1 Supersede shareholder rights? Yes / No 
11.9.2 Remove and replace management? Yes / No 
11.9.3 Remove and replace directors? Yes / No 
        (1) Prompt Corrective Power 
Whether the law establishes predetermined levels of 
bank solvency deterioration that force automatic 
actions, such as intervention. 
WBG 11.8 * (11.1 + 11.2 + 11.3.1 + 11.3.2 + 11.3.3 
+ 6.1)  
 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
Principal component of the assigned values for the 
items in parenthesis multiplied by 1 if there is a 
legally pre-determined level of solvency 
deterioration forcing automatic actions and by 0 if 
not. 
11.8 Does the Law establish pre-determined levels of solvency 
deterioration which forces automatic actions (like intervention)? 
Yes / No 
11.1 Are there any mechanisms of cease and desist-type orders, 
whose infraction leads to the automatic imposition of civil and 
penal sanctions on the bank's directors and managers? Yes / No 
11.2 Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors or 
management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential 
losses? Yes / No 
11.3 Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors' decision to 
distribute: 
11.3.1 Dividends? Yes / No 
11.3.2 Bonuses? Yes / No 
11.3.3 Management fees? Yes / No 
6.1 Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its 
internal organizational structure? Yes / No 
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        (2) Restructuring Power  Whether the supervisory authorities have the power to 
restructure and reorganize a troubled bank. 
WBG 11.9.1 + 11.9.2 + 11.9.3   
 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
Higher values indicate greater restructuring power 
11.9 Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the 
supervisory agency or any other government agency do the 
following:  
11.9.1 Supersede shareholder rights? Yes / No 
11.9.2 Remove and replace management? Yes / No 
11.9.3 Remove and replace directors? Yes / No 
        (3) Declaring Insolvency Power  Whether the supervisory authorities have the power to 
declare a deeply troubled bank insolvent. 
WBG 11.6 + 11.7  
 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
Higher values indicating greater power. 
11.6 Can the supervisory agency legally declare-such that this 
declaration supersedes the rights of bank shareholders-that a bank 
is insolvent? Yes / No 
11.7 Does the Banking Law give authority to the supervisory 
agency to intervene-that is, suspend some or all ownership rights-a 
problem bank? Yes / No 
   (b) Supervisory Forbearance Discretion  
Whether the supervisory authorities may engage in 
forbearance when confronted with violations of laws 
and regulations or other imprudent behavior. 
WBG 11.9.4 + (12.10 - 1) * (-1) + (11.8 -1) * (-1) + 
(12.11 -1) * (-1)  
 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
Sum of these assigned values such that higher values 
indicate greater discretion. 
11.9.4 Can the supervisory agency or any other government agency 
forbear certain prudential regulations? Yes / No 
11.8 Does the Law establish pre-determined levels of solvency 
deterioration which forces automatic actions (like intervention)? 
Yes / No 
12.10 If an infraction of any prudential regulation is found by a 
supervisor, must it be reported? Yes / No 
12.11 Are there mandatory actions in these cases? Yes / No 
   (c) Loan Classification Stringency  The classification of loans in arrears as sub-standard, 
doubtful and loss. 
WBG 9.2.1 - 9.2.3 (days) 
 
If there is a loan classification system, the actual 
minimum number of days beyond which a loan in 
arrears must be classified as sub-standard, then 
doubtful, and finally loss are summed.  Higher 
values indicate less stringency. 
9.2 Classification of loans in arrears based on their quality: after 
how many days is a loan in arrears classified as: 
9.2.1 Sub-standard ?  
9.2.2 Doubtful?  
9.2.3 Loss?  
   (d) Provisioning Stringency   The minimum required provisions as loans become 
sub-standard, doubtful and loss. 
WBG 9.3.1 - 9.3.3 (percent) 
 
The sum of the minimum required provisioning 
percentages when a loan is successively classified as 
substandard, doubtful, and loss.  If a range is 
provided, the minimum percentage is used.  Higher 
values indicate greater stringency. 
9.3 What are the minimum required provision as loans become: 
9.3.1 Sub-standard?  
9.3.2 Doubtful?  
9.3.3 Loss?  
   (e) Diversification Index 
Whether there are explicit, verifiable, quantifiable 
guidelines for asset diversification, and banks are 
allowed to make loans abroad. 
WBG 7.1 + (7.2 - 1) * (-1)  
Yes = 1; No = 0 
Sum of these assigned values, with higher values 
indicating more diversification. 
7.1 Are there explicit, verifiable, and quantifiable guidelines 
regarding asset diversification? Yes / No 
7.2 Are banks prohibited from making loans abroad? Yes / No 
              
6.  Official Supervisory Resource Variables 
   (a) Supervisor Tenure  The average tenure of a professional bank supervisor.  WBG 12.9.1 (years) 
12.8 What is the average tenure of current supervisors (i.e., what is 
the average number of years current supervisors have been 
supervisors)? 
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   (b) Independence of Supervisory Authority-Political  
The degree to which the supervisory authority is 
independent within the government from political 
influence. 
WBG 12.2, 12.2.1 and 12.2.2 
 
1 = low independence; 2 = medium independence; 3 
= high independence 
12.2 To whom are the supervisory bodies responsible or 
accountable? 
12.2.1 How is the head of the supervisory agency (and other 
directors) appointed? 
12.2.2 How is the head of the supervisory agency (and other 
directors) removed? 
   (c) Independence of Supervisory Authority - Banks 
The degree to which the supervisory authority is 





12.14 Are supervisors legally liable for their actions? 
   (d) Independence of Supervisory Authority - Overall 
The degree to which the supervisory authority is 
independent from the government and legally 
protected from the banking industry. 
WBG (b) + (c)                                                                 
Higher values signify greater independence    
  (e) Multiple Supervisors 
This variable indicates whether there is a single 
official regulatory of banks, or whether multiple 
supervisor share responsibility for supervising the 
nation’s banks.  
This variable is assigned a value of 1 if there is more 
than one supervisor and 0 otherwise. 
12.1 What body/agency supervises banks?  
12.1.1 Is there more than one supervisory body?  
12.2 To whom are the supervisory bodies responsible or 
accountable?  
12.2.1 How is the head of the supervisory agency (and other 
directors) appointed?  
12.2.2 How is the head of the supervisory agency (and other 
directors) removed?  
              
7.  Private Monitoring Variables 
   (a) Certified Audit Required  Whether there is a compulsory external audit by a 
licensed or certified auditor.  WBG 5.1 * 5.3 (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
5.1 Is an external audit a compulsory obligation for banks? Yes / 
No 
5.3 Are auditors licensed or certified? Yes / No 
   (b) Percent of 10 Biggest Banks Rated by International 
Rating Agencies 
The percentage of the top ten banks that are rated by 
international credit rating agencies.  WBG 10.7.1 (percent)  10.7.1  What percent of the top ten banks are rated by international 
credit rating agencies (e.g., Moody's, Standard and Poor)? 
   (c) No Explicit Deposit Insurance Scheme 
Whether there is an explicit deposit insurance scheme 
and, if not, whether depositors were fully compensated 
the last time a bank failed. 
WBG 1 if 8.1 = 0 and 8.4 = 0;  0 otherwise 
 
Yes =1; No =0 
Higher values indicate more private supervision 
8.1 Is there an explicit deposit insurance protection system? Yes / 
No 
8.4 Were depositors wholly compensated (to the extent of legal 
protection) the last time a bank failed? Yes / No 
   (d) Bank Accounting 
Whether the income statement includes accrued or 
unpaid interest or principal on nonperforming loans 
and whether banks are required to produce 
consolidated financial statements. 
WBG (10.1.1 - 1)*(-1) + 10.3 + 10.6                              
Yes=1; No=0                                                                   
Sum of assigned values, with higher values 
indicating more informative bank accounts. 
10.1.1 Does accrued, though unpaid interest/principal enter the 
income statement while the loan is still non-performing?                     
10.3 Are financial institutions required to produce consolidated 
accounts covering all bank and any non-bank financial 
subsidiaries? 10.6 Are bank directors legally liable if information 
disclosed is erroneous or misleading? 
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   (e) Private Monitoring Index 
Whether (a) occurs, (b) equals 100%, (c) occurs, (d) 
occurs, off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the 
public, banks must disclose risk management 
procedures to the public, and subordinated debt is 
allowable (required) as a part of regulatory capital. 
WBG: (a) + [1 if (b) equals 100% ; 0 otherwise] + 
(c) + (d) + 10.4.1 + 10.5 + 3.5 
 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
Higher values indicating more private supervision. 
10.4.1 Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to the public? Yes / 
No 
10.5 Must banks disclose their risk management procedures to the 
public? Yes / No 
3.5 Is subordinated debt allowable (required) as part of capital? Yes 
/ No 
              
8.  Deposit Insurance Scheme Variables 
   (a) Deposit Insurer Power 
Whether the deposit insurance authority has the 
authority to make the decision to intervene in  a bank, 
take legal action against bank directors or officials, and 
has ever taken any legal action against bank directors 
or officers. 
WBG 8.1.5 + 8.6 + 8.7  
 
 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
Sum of assigned values, with higher values 
indicating more power. 
8.1.5 Does the deposit insurance authority make the decision to 
intervene a bank?  Yes / No 
8.6 Can the deposit insurance agency/fund take legal action against 
bank directors or other bank officials? Yes / No 
8.7  Has the deposit insurance agency/fund ever taken legal action 
against bank directors or other bank officials? Yes / No 
   (b) Deposit Insurance Funds-to-Total Bank Assets  The size of the deposit insurance fund relative to total 
bank assets.  WBG 8.1.2 (pure number)  8.1.2 What is the ratio of accumulated funds to total bank assets? 
   (c) Moral Hazard Index  The degree to which moral hazard exists. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) 
 
Higher values indicate more moral hazard. 
  
              
9.  Market Structure Indicators 
   (a) Bank Concentration  The degree of concentration of deposits in the 5 largest 
banks.  WBG 2.6  (pure number)  2.6 Of deposit-taking institutions in your country, what fraction of 
deposits is held by the five (5) largest banks? 
   (b) Foreign-Owned Banks  The extent to which the banking system's assets are 
foreign owned.  WBG 3.8 (percent)  3.8 What fraction of the banking system's assets is in banks that are 
50% or more foreign owned? 
   (c) Government-Owned Banks  The extent to which the banking system's assets are 
government owned.  WBG 3.7 (percent)  3.7 What fraction of the banking system's assets is in banks that are 
50% or more government owned? 
              
Note: WBG denotes World Bank Guide, which is available at www.worldbank.org/research/interest/intrstweb.htm 
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-0.02                       1 Entry Applications Denied  (0.904)
Capital  Regulatory Index                           0.02 -0.47** 1   
    (0.853)                       (0.000)
0.04                     0.36** -0.20* 1    Restrictions on  Bank Activities 
Index (0.757)  (0.003)                    (0.072)   
Private  Monitoring Index                         -0.16 -0.47** 0.23* -0.35** 1   
   (0.201)  (0.000)  (0.060)  (0.004)                  
Moral Hazard Index  -0.21  -0.19  0.29**                -0.23 0.18 1      
   (0.152)  (0.247)  (0.046)    )               (0.110) (0.230   
Official Supervisory Power   0.01  0.08  -0.19  -0.05  0.07  0.18  1               
 Index  (0.937)  (0.620)                  (0.215) (0.720) (0.685) (0.375)      
0.10                          0.14 -0.04 0.13 -0.21* 0.23 0.48** 1 Prompt Corrective Power  Index  (0.388)                           (0.284) (0.700) (0.269) (0.094) (0.122) (0.001)
No Foreign Loans  0.03  0.26**  -0.02  0.23**  -0.21*  -0.17  0.03  0.09  1           
   (0.820)  (0.034)  (0.840)                        (0.040) (0.081) (0.243) (0.847) (0.408)
Government-Owned  Banks                              -0.13 0.39** -0.15 0.33** -0.36** -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 0.27** 1
   (0.273)  (0.003)  (0.209)                       (0.005) (0.005) (0.700) (0.677) (0.431) (0.021)
Bank Development  -0.11  -0.20  0.21*  -0.39**  0.48**  0.07  -0.09  -0.24**  -0.08  -0.29**  1       
   (0.325)  (0.122)  (0.070)                        (0.000) (0.000) (0.627) (0.546) (0.040) (0.513) (0.014)
Net Interest Margin  0.18  0.11  -0.18  0.28**  -0.37**  -0.03  0.12  0.14  0.19*  0.26**  -0.57**  1     
   (0.120)  (0.418)  (0.125)                       (0.014) (0.002) (0.852) (0.459) (0.249) (0.095) (0.037) (0.000)
Overhead  Costs                             0.23** -0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.25** 0.12 0.11 0.09 -0.02 0.30** -0.58** 0.76** 1
   (0.041)  (0.857)  (0.823)                        (0.715) (0.044) (0.415) (0.496) (0.453) (0.836) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000)
Major Banking Crisis  -0.17  0.14  -0.11  0.18  -0.07  0.43**  0.13  0.15  0.17  0.26**  -0.21*  0.13  0.14  1 
   (0.123)  (0.278)  (0.326)                        (0.116) (0.569) (0.002) (0.398) (0.197) (0.131) (0.027) (0.061) (0.275) (0.237)
Government Integrity  -0.09  -0.48**  0.31**  -0.55**  0.62**  0.11  -0.26  -0.24*  -0.37**  -0.42**  0.54**  -0.44**  -0.42**  -0.41** 
   (0.509)  (0.001)  (0.018)                        (0.000) (0.000) (0.455) (0.154) (0.067) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
                          
                     
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
Note: P-values are in parentheses. ** indicates significant at the 0.05 level, while * indicates significant at the 0.10 level. And the following indices are principal component versions: Entry into Banking 
Requirements, Capital Regulatory Index, Restrictions on Bank Activities, Private Monitoring Index, and Official Supervisory Power. 
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Bank Development  0.189**            -0.011 0.089** -0.042 0.002 -0.118**    75  0.597 
   (0.004)                   (0.725) (0.003) (0.172) (0.939) (0.001)
Net Interest Margin  0.042**                -0.003 -0.010** 0.000 0.003 0.004 75 0.264 
   (0.000)                   (0.373) (0.012) (0.870) (0.190) (0.241)
Overhead Costs  0.032**                0.001 -0.006* 0.000 0.003** -0.001 75 0.201 
   (0.000)                   (0.789) (0.077) (0.965) (0.042) (0.731)
Nonperforming Loans  0.074*                -0.035* -0.042** 0.004 0.006 -0.011 68 0.247 
   (0.063)            (0.058) (0.007) (0.799) (0.586) (0.567)         
           
  

























Bank Development  0.232**              -0.028 0.071** -0.029 -0.002 -0.119** -0.169 68  0.623 
   (0.000)                   (0.428) (0.025) (0.322) (0.926) (0.002) (0.154)
Net Interest Margin  0.041**              -0.002 -0.009** -0.001 0.003 0.006** 0.006 66  0.310 
   (0.000)                   (0.660) (0.045) (0.713) (0.156) (0.075) (0.760)
Overhead Costs  0.029**              0.003 -0.004 0.000 0.004** 0.000 0.022 66  0.298 
   (0.000)                   (0.289) (0.282) (0.889) (0.036) (0.984) (0.209)
Nonperforming Loans  0.029              -0.034* -0.028* -0.005 0.011 -0.021 0.160** 63  0.318 
   (0.366)              (0.096) (0.085) (0.713) (0.235) (0.209) (0.030)      
      
            
 
 
            Notes: with  P-values are in parentheses under the estimated coefficients, using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from an OLS regression. ** indicates significant at the    
                0.05 level, while * indicates significant at the 0.10 level.  Each row is a separate regression. Each regression also contains legal origin dummy variables (Common Law, French Civil         
          Law, German Civil Law, and Socialist Law). And the following indices are principal component versions: Entry into Banking Requirements, Capital Regulatory Index, Restrictions   
     on    Bank  Activities,  Private  Monitoring Index, and Official Supervisory Power. 
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  1                  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
N                    52 46 43 51 40 40 41 43 43








































































Private Monitoring Index  0.391 
(0.431) 
-0.016 
(0.980)    0.169 
(0.709) 
1.168 
(0.121)      



















































Moral Hazard Index      0.719** 








Diversification Index               -13.443** 
(0.012) 
Diversification Index*Ln (GDP)        0.497** 
(0.014)       
Limitations on Foreign Bank Entry/Ownership          1.911* 
(0.052)      
Moral  Hazard  Index*Political  Openness            -0.513** 
(0.013) 
Political  Openness            0.762 
(0.141) 
Moral  Hazard  Index*Rule  of Law               -0.288** 
(0.035) 
R u l e   o f   L a w             -0.295 
(0.535) 
Moral  Hazard  Index*Official  Supervisory  Power          -0.031 
(0.842)   
Moral  Hazard  Index*Capital  Regulatory Index              -0.131 
(0.600) 
Note: Each column gives complete logit results and the P-values in parentheses under the estimated coefficients are based on  Huber/White robust standard errors. ** indicates significant at the 0.05 level, 
while * indicates significant at the 0.10 level.   
The sample for regression 2 is restricted to countries with some equity market activity (i.e., to countries where the IFC obtains trading data) and the following indices are principal component versions: 
Entry into Banking Requirements, Capital Regulatory Index, Restrictions on  Bank Activities, Private Monitoring Index, and Official Supervisory Power. 
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 Table 5 
Bank Development, Regulation and Supervision: Instrumental Variables 
Dependent Variable: Bank Development (Bank Credit to the Private Sector as Share of GDP) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Entry into Banking Requirements Index  -0.536                            
    ( 0 . 3 9 0 )                 
Limitations  on  Foreign  Bank  Entry/Ownership                    -0.388*
      . 0 9 2 )                 ( 0
Entry Applications Denied                  -0.785** 
       . 0 0 4 )                ( 0
Capital Regulatory Index           0.340**                            
            (0.024)                            
Restrictions on  Bank Activities Index          -0.145**                  
         . 0 1 0 )              ( 0
Private Monitoring Index                 0.252**                      
          . 0 0 1 )             ( 0
Moral  Hazard Index                       0.109
                     (0.387)                   
Official  Supervisory  Power  Index                    -0.167
            0 . 1 4 8 )           (
Prompt Corrective Power Index            2 . 4 1 9          -
             0 . 5 1 8 )          (
No  Foreign  Loans                    -0.624*
              . 0 8 0 )         ( 0
Government-Owned Banks                                -2.075**       
               . 0 4 4 )        ( 0
Supervisory  Independence                    0.162*
                0 . 0 8 0 )       (
Multiple  Supervisory  Agencies                 2.498
                 0 . 2 9 5 )   (
                                         
Constant                            -0.210 0.290** 0.460** 0.394* 0.308** 0.216** 0.296 0.137 -0.598 0.421** 0.575** 0.146 0.420**
    (0.835)                          (0.000) (0.000) (0.077) (0.000) (0.002) (0.139) (0.494) (0.742) (0.000) (0.002) (0.421) (0.000)
                   
OIR-Test
1                            2.30 2.07 1.89 1.14 4.76 1.69 4.41 5.15 0.34 4.85 2.82 6.76 0.30
                   
N                            77 59 61 76 76 77 49 77 75 77 69 76 76
Notes: P-values are in parentheses under the estimated coefficients, using a GMM instrumental variables regression. ** indicates significant at the 0.05 level, while * indicates significant at the 0.10 level.         
Each column represents a separate regression of Bank Development on Common Law, French Civil Law, German Civil Law, Socialist Law, and the variable listed in the first column.            
Instruments: Regious composition variables (Catholic, Muslim, and Other Denomination variables), Legal origin dummy variables (Common Law, French Civil Law,          
 German Civil Law, and Socialist Law), and latitudinal distance from the equator.          
1 Over Identifying Restriction Test: Tests null hypothsis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residual.           
     5% Critical Values for OIR Test (3 d.f.): 7.82.           
 
For regressions 2 and 7, there are no socialist legal origin countries with data so the Socialist Law dummy variable is excluded .          
 
The following indices are principal component versions: Entry into Banking Requirements, Capital Regulatory Index, Restrictions on  Bank Activities, Private Monitoring Index,            
Official Supervisory Power, and Prompt  Corrective  Power.      
 